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NOTES

tives of value" is a misdemeanor3 0 and that such a device may be destroyed
by the sheriff atfer appropriate procedure has been complied with by
the officers of the court.3 1 It seems entirely possible that the Wyoming
courts could hold that a pinball machine is such a device, and that free
games are representative of value. The legislature has not specifically
declared the gaming statutes of Wyoming to be either remedial or penal.
The gaming laws are in Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 19'45, Chapter 9entitled "Criminal Offenses." 32 However, the legislature did point out
that gaming devices were considered to be a nuisance.3 3 The fact that the
gaming statutes are found in the criminal section of the statute book does
not necessarily mean that the courts must strictly construe them and it is
entirely possible that they could be construed as remedial in nature. But
until this question is presented to the Wyoming Supreme Court the answer
will remain unknown.
If the legislature deems that pinball machines are by their nature
things which are undesirable, it would appear that it would be advisable
to amend our gambling statutes to specifically prohibit them. An expression of a state policy on these devices would eliminate the doubt that may
arise. The Statc of New York has been foremost in legislation which has
sought to completely outlaw these devices, which encourage the gambling
instinct in people. 34 Legislation such as that found in New York, if
adopted in Wyoming, would make future court decisions on this point
unnecessary.
ROBERT

J.

HAND

TRADING STAMPS
Regardless of legal concepts connected with the trading stamp, it is a
conclusive presumption that it appeals to consumers like the apple in the
Garden of Eden appealed to Eve.'
Generally, consumers receive trading stamps contemporaneously with
the cash purchase 2 of an item from a retailer who has adopted the stamp
30.
31.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-818 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-825 (1945).

32.
33.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. ch. 9 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-825 (1945),

34.
1.

2.

"Any gambling table, gambling device, or

paraphernalia adopted (adapted), devised or designed for the purpose of playing,
conducting, or carrying on, any game of chance, prohibited by the laws of this
state, is hereby declared to be a nuisance ...
"
New York Penal Code § 982. For a good discussion of the New York gambling
situation see 43 J.Crim.L. 114.
Life Magazine, Mar. 4, 1957, pp. 114-126. These facts brought out in the article
demonstrate the popularity of trading stamps: More than 400 stamp companies in
1956 printed nearly $600 million worth of stamps, which were sold to 170,000 businesses in this country.
Time Magazine Nov. 19, 1956, p. 97: "Trading stamp tax, passed by North
Dakota Legislature to discourage stamp giveaways, was thrown out by state's stamphungry voters in first popular referendum on issue."
Colgate-Palmolive Co., and Sperry & Hutchison Co., Intervenor v. Max Dischter &
Sons, Inc., 142 F.Supp. 545 (1956).
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plan, but they have been issued on payment of a charge account *that is
paid promptly at the end of the month. 3 The stamps are ordinarily redeemable in prizes. 4 Retailers employing the scheme may acquire stamps
in one of three ways: (1) Under a purchasing agreement from an independent stamp manufacturer, 5 or (2) the retailer may print his own
stamps for exclusive use in his store or chain of stores,6 or (3) independent
merchants may band together in a particular locality, and under a recipro7
cal agreement, uidertake such a plan jointly.
Gleeful merchants who issue stamps have sung these praises to the
courts: (1) Giving stamps to customers at the cash register has induced a
larger number of them to pay cash for their purchases, thus, lessening the
risks of receiving bad checks tendered in payment of accounts and decreasing their worry over collectability of slow accounts; s (2) where stamps
are issued to customers who pay their bills by a certain date, those accounts
are paid more promptly than if no stamps were given; 9 (3) trading stamps
are a more effective means of increasing volume of sales than is an ordinary
cash discount for cash; 10 (4) an over-all trade advantage results in that
more customers are enticed into the store;" (5) employing this means of
advertising has decreased the expenses of that item, and at the same time,
has done more good than other types of advertising formerly used; 12 (6)
the consumer is given something of value in addition to his purchase,
13
which heretofore he did not receive.
On the other hand, proponents of the abolition of trading stamps
have voiced these criticisms through the courts: (1) The net effect of
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Sperry & Hutchison Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 226 P.2d 501 (1951).
Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal.App.2d 684, 131 P.2d
856 (1942). This court considered that there was no distinction between trading
stamps redeemable in cash or merchandise; but see, Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237
Wis. 41, 295, N.W. 737 (1941), where it was stated in the dissenting opinion that the
objections to stamps redeemable in merchandise were not applicable to redemptions
in cash.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 883 (1904).
For
analysis of the nature of the agreement between the retailer and the issuing company,
see Sperry & Hutchison Co. v. Hudson, note 3 supra.
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
Id. Involved cash register receipts which the court treated as trading stamps.
Trade Commission v. Bush, 259 P.2d 304 (Utah 1953).
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
The
trading stamp may be considered a financial inducement to customers to pay their
bills on or before the date specified in sales invoices. The court quoted with
approval a statement contained in Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice,
pp. 499, 500, that a cash discount was a reward for prompt payment and was a
practice long established and authoritatively recognized as being not a reduction
from the purchase price. See note 27 infra.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dischter & Sons, Inc., note 2, supra, testimony of an
expert witness.
Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, note 4, supra; Sperry &
Hutchinson v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., note 5, supra.
Sperry & Hutchinson v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., note 5, supra.
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
Contained in
Justice Drew's dissent is the language that appeared upon the stamp in question:
"Refusing to take Yellow Trading Stamps from the storekeeper is like forgetting
your change. Yellow Stamps are not something for nothing, but something instead
of nothing-a discount for the money you spend with the storekeeper."

NOTES

giving the buyer something extra, is that he is not paying the price asked,
but the price less the value of the discount, and therefore, less than the
fair trade price, and this is price cutting in violation of the Fair Trade
Act; 14 (2) their use and condonation opens the door to carefully devised
schemes to affect indirect price cutting; 15 (3) such a scheme tempts by a
promise of a value greater than the article offered, and hence may be
thought of as a lure to improvidence, 16 in that it encourages profligate and
wasteful buying;"7 (4) a middle man is introduced who receives a profit
and therefore adds to the cost of the article; I8 (5) the plan affords an
opportunity to defraud the public in regard to values and prices, in that
it detracts attention from the quality and price of the article purchased
and from the fact that the discount stamp is added to the cost; 19 (6) it
presents an opportunity for coercion in that merchants may be compelled
to buy stamps against their wishes in order to meet competition, thus,
20
competition is stifled unless they adopt a similar plan.
Cases arising under the Fair Trade Act generally conform to this fact
situation: A manufacturer has supplied a merchant with a trade-marked
article for resale to the public. To assure that a price war will not develop
which would destroy the market value of the article, the manufacturer
wishes to standardize the retail price of the article so that the merchant
cannot cut the price below a certain minimum. Under the Fair Trade Act
of the state where the merchant is located, 21 the manufacturer is allowed
to contract with retailers in that state and establish a minimum fair trade
22
price.
If the manufacturer has executed a fair trade price agreement with
retailers in that state, he is empowered to enjoin sales below that minimum.. 3 The question then is this: If a retailer is selling an article at the
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dischter & Sons, Inc., note 2, supra. District Judge
Aldrich stated: "I believe the difference (between trading stamps and ordinary cash
discounts) is substantial, and that roughly that difference is the measure that they
exceed a true discount for cash. Accordingly, even if I accept S. & H.'s proposition
that a reasonable discount for cash is not inconsistent with the maintenance of the
minimum price, it does not go far enough." Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, note 6,
supra. Redeeming cash register receipts is price cutting in violation of fair trade
legislation.
Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros., Inc., note 13, supra (dissenting opinion).
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679 (1916).
Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky 394, 247 SW. 14 (1923).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Note, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 715, 716, note 5. Fair trade contracts are authorized by statute
in all states except Texas, Vermont and Missouri, but held unconstitutional in
Colorado and Florida.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-302 (1945). Also see note 24, infra.
Under various forms of the Act, the manufacturer may have gained privity with
the merchant by virtue of the contract between the two, or if the merchant was
not a party to the agreement, the manufacturer may acquire privity with him by
virtue of a non-signer clause in the Act. Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-306 (1945), contains
a non-signer clause. The states, through the exercise of their police power, have
enacted legislation on intrastate commerce; the Act under consideration being such
a product. However, there is a growing tendency toward holding non-signer
clauses uncontitutional, and in turn, this attack may weaken the entire foundation
of fair trade legislation. For a discussion of constitutional aspects of non-signer
clauses, see note, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 715 (Summer 1956).
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fair trade price established by contract, and the retailer gives away trading
stamps with customer purchases of the article, is he selling that article
below the minimum set out in the fair trade agreement?
The determination of the question rests on whether there has been
a price-cut, and these circumstances must be studied: (1) The intent or
purpose behind the adoption of the plan; (2) whether the stamps are
given across the board on all items, or in just certain items; (3) do all
customers have equal opportunity to receive them; (4) the relative value
of the stamp as compared with the cost of the item purchased; (5) whether
the trading stamp scheme adopted vests stamp holders with an immediate
property right or merely gives them a chance to convert it into something
of value
Under the- Wyoming Fair Trade' Act, 24 if the retailer wilfully intends
to affect a price-cut below the fair trade agreement, or has knowledge that
his selling price is below the fair trade standard, he has violated the Act
and his operation may be enjoined. However, under another section2 5
of the same Act, the element of intent is not required in order to prepetrate a violation.
Whether the retailer is guilty of selling below the fair trade minimum
presents the problem of the net effect of the stamp on the price of the
commodity on which it was issued. The courts are unified on two points:
(1) For a retailer to come within liability of the Act, he must have directly
cut the price of a commodity within the Act's protection, or (2) he must
have accomplished the same result in respect to the commodity by a device
which was palpable subterfuge resorted to for the purpose of circumventing
2 6

the law.

Travel beyond this ground must be over one of three routes: (1) The
ordinary trading stamp is a cash discount and not a discount on the price
of the commodity purchased; 27 (2) conceding that the trading stamp is a
cash discount, it is also a trade or quantity discount and therefore a price
24.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-306 (1945): "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering
for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract
entered into pursuant to the provisions of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair
competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby."

25.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-303 (1945) which sets out three acts which may constitute a
violation of the Act, without reference to intent, they are: (1) The offering or
giving of any article of value in connection with sale of such commodity; (2) the
offering or making of any concessions of any kind whatsoever (whether by the
giving of coupons or otherwise) in connection with any such sale; or (3) the sale
or offering for sale of such commodity in combination with any other commodity,
shall be deemed a violation of such resale price restriction.
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., note 13 supra.

26.
27.

Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, note 4, supra. Held, that
the giving of discounts for cash did not violate fair trade legislation, since a cash
discount was but a reward for prompt payment and not a price cut, and that the
use of the trading stamp did not effect a reduction in price of the articles sold so
as to violate the Act.

No'rEs
cutting device; 2 8 (3) conceding that it is a price cutting device, its effect
is insignificant and therefore the maxim "de minimis non curat lex"
29
applies.
:
The element of the retailer's intent under the Unfair Practice Act 10
is clearly spelled out. Acts committed with intent to (1) injure competi-

tors, and (2) destroy competition, are condemned. : 1 The problem is not
simplified by this definition of intent, for in regard to the issuance of

trading stamps, the proof of this intent becomes difficult.

Fewer trading

stamp cases have been decided under this Act than have been adjudicated
under the Fair Trade Act. However, of those reported in connection with
28.

29.

30.

31.

This type of discount, which favors only certain customers or is limited to a
particular item, should be distinguished from a volume-purchase discount in which
all customers are treated equally. See notes 30(5), 33 and 35, infra, but see,
note 34, infra.
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., note 13, supra. Held, that the doctrine of
de minimis non curat lex should apply, if the deviation were a mere trifle, which
if continued in practice, would weight little or nothing on public interest, it might
properly be overlooked. But see, Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, note 6, supra: "The
Act applies to any discount, regardless of the amount, that cuts the price of an
article. By allowing a breach, no matter how small, we invite the flood, and unless
the legislature decrees the exception, we are powerless to allow it."
This area of fair trade legislation is concerned with discriminatory or monopolistic
practices which result in unfair competition and is sometimes referred to as the
unfair competition act. One or all of the following six provisions may be contained
in a particular state's act: (1) A prohibition against combinations between producers, manufacturers or distributors, for the purpose of preventing or destroying
competition, controlling or influencing production of prices, gaining unjust and
unreasonable profits, or discriminating unfairly in prices of commodities between
(2)
markets. This language is contained in Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-401 (1945).
Forbidding any person or firm to prevent competition among other persons or
firms by intentionally seeking such result by the use of locality discrimination in
prices, or any scheme of special rebates, collateral contracts or any device of any
nature whereby such discrimination is accomplished. See, Wyo. Comp. Stat. §
39-406 (1945); also see, State v. Langley, note 31, infra. (3) It shall be unlawful
for any business establishment to sell or offer for sale any article at less than the
cost thereof to such vendor, or give, offer to give or advertise to give away any
article or product for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition. See, Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-407 (1945); also see, Trade Comm. v. Bush, note
8, supra. It was held that trading stamps used in the customary manner did not
violate this provision. (4) Prohibition against giving premiums with retail purchases of gasoline or bakery goods, for the purpose of injuring or destroying coinpetition. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Kent County, 287 Mich. 555, 283 N.W. 686
(1939).
(5) It is deemed a misdemeanor where any person or firm shall allow
certain purchasers' secret payment, allowance of rebates, refunds, commissions, or
special services which are not extended to all purchasers, where such device tends
to destroy competition and is an unfair trade practice. See Wyo. Comp. Stat. §
(6) Prohibition against unfair price discrimination of petroleum
39-411 (1945).
products among market areas within the state. See, Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 39-417
(1945).
In upholding the constituState v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938).
tionality of unfair competition legislation adopted in 1937, Blume, C. J., speaking
for the majority of the Court said: "The Act in question only provides against use
and sale of one's property for the purpose of destroying the business of a competitor. The owner or dealer may sell for any price he may choose, or on any
terms he may adopt, without reference to what effect his action may have upon
the trade or business of others, so long as he does not do so for the purpose named.
It may be that by underselling others he may draw trade away from them, or,
indeed, the secondary effect may be to compel them to adopt his scale of price or
abandon their business, yet, if his conduct is not for the purpose and with intention
prohibited by statute, he is violating no law, and no one can legally object to or
interfere with his methods. The statute clearly makes the purpose with which the
act is done the controlling element of the offense."
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the former, the ordinary and customary use of trading stamps is not unfair
32
competition.
When stamps are given only on particular articles, the transaction

would appear more like a quantity discount device33 than where stamps
are issued on all articles sold, but even the latter may be susceptible of
invalidation under fair trade legislation.3 4 In a like manner, where all
customers do not have equal opportunity to receive stamps, there is strong
indication that a discount from the purchase price or a trade discount was
intended.3 5 The relation of the value of the stamp to the purchase price
of the item on which it was given, may be a decisive factor in invalidating
the plan, 3 6 for the courts seem to take judicial notice of the fact that the
customary cash discount of 2%,3 7 and a valuation over tL amount is
8
viewed as a lure for purposes other than inducement to pay cash.3
Legislative attacks on trading stamps have been waged on two major
fronts: (1) Statutes aimed at total or partial prohibition of their use, and
(2) those which have sought to exact a license or tax fee on those who
issue them. Where consitutionality of these statutes has been challenged,
it is claimed that they violate due process or equal protection clauses of
federal and state constitutions in that, (1) the statute is an improper
exercise of a state's police power,39 or (2) the classification of persons falling
32.
33.

34.

35.

36.

37.
38.
39.

Trade Comm. v. Bush, note 8, supra.
Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, note 4, supra. "Respondent's
fair trade minimum-priced articles are not singled out by appellant as objects to
which alone the trading stamp privileges attach. No discrimination is made for or
against them."
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dischter & Sons, Inc., note 2, supra. "It is not
important that stamps are given on all merchandise across the board, whether
fair-traded or not. A quantity discount on fair-traded products is no less a quantity
discount by reason of the fact that it is given on other articles as well."
Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, note 4, supra. Appellant's
stamp plan was not discriminatory as to commodities or purchasers: "The policy
may be said to be of uniform application both as to goods sold and as to purchasers of the same, and logically falls into the classification of 'cash discount'
rather than 'price cut'."
The practice of
Palmer v. Angert, 275 App.Div. 965, 90 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1949).
redeeming cash register receipts for 10% of their amounts, in merchandise, was
considered a price-cutting device in violation of the minimum prices established
by fair trade contracts.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dischter & Sons, Inc., note 2, supra. Judge Aldrich
stated that fair trade legislation was not intended to interfere with normal credit
arrangements such as 2% off if bills are paid in 10 days.
Trade Comm. v. Bush, note 8, supra. Concurring opinion by Wolf, J., indicating
that if the stamps had possessed a value substantially in excess of 2%, their use
may have run afoul with fair trade legislation.
Such statutes may be held invalid because they
Annot., 26 A.L.R. 707, 717 (1923).
impair the obligations of contracts, or constitute a deprivation of property without
due process, or operate as a restraint of trade, or as an interference with interstate
commerce, or as an infringement of the constitutional liberties of citizens. State
v. Dalton, 22 R.I. 77, 46 Atil. 234 (1900). Trading stamp legislation does not look
to public health, safety, nor morals. Compare, State v. Lutey Bros., 55 Mont. 545,
Held, that a statute aimed against the use of goods as
179 Pac. 457 (1919).
premiums, was not intended to prohibit trading stamps which were used as a cash
discount. Contra: State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (1917); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle, 166 Wis. 613, 166 N.W. 54 (1918); Ed. Schuster & Co.
v. Steffes, note 4, supra; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, note 9, supra. The
dissenting opinion stated that a state's police power was not limited to public
health, safety or morals, but may be extended to any matters touching upon the
welfare, prosperity, comfort and convenience of the public.

NOTES
40
within the operation of the statute is discriminatory or arbitrary.
41
In a series of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916, it
was conclusively decided that states may legislate on trading stamps without
violating the due process clause of the 14th amendment, Several state
courts have followed the federal view in upholding the validity of such
statutes, 42 but the overwhelming majority of states have repeatedly held
43
these statutes unconstitutional.

It is interesting to note that the Wyoming legislature twice considered
bills that involved trading stamps. Both involved a partial restraint on the
use of stamps. The first bill 44 was presented as an Act to amend and re5
enact a statute relating to unfair competition, 4 which in general prohibited wilful destruction of competition by unjust discrimination in cost,
quantity or quality of an item offered for sale between various sections
of the state.
The last sentence of the statute sought to be amended read as follows:
"The inhibition hereof against locality discrimination shall embrace any
scheme of special rebates, collateral contracts or any device of any. nature
whereby such discrimination is, in substance of fact, effected in violation
of the spirit and intent of this Act." The only change proposed was to
delete the words "against locality discriminition," and insert after "collateral
contracts" the words "trading stamps." The bill was defeated.
Had this bill been enacted into law, what would have been the status
of the trading stamp in Wyoming? Their use would not have been prohibited, for the proposal merely attached a restraint or condition on their
use, i.e., they could not be employed with intent to destroy competition by
unfair discrimination. The present Act includes the words "any device of
any nature whereby such discrimination is . . . effected," and the burden is
upon the complanant to prove that such a device was employed with
intent to destroy competition.
40.

41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 Pac. 894 (1921). A statute that imposed a
tax upon the use of trading stamps purchased from others, while permitting a
merchant to issue them without tax when he furnished them himself, was held
void as denying equal protection of the laws. State v. Lothrops-Farnham Co.,
Held, that a license tax statute was unconstitu84 N.H. 322, 150 At. 551 (1930).
tional as being prohibitive, and an unreasonable interference with one's right to
acquire and possess property. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 65
Held, a statute aimed at eliminating redemption directly
N.W.2d 410 (1954).
from the manufacturer, was unconstitutional because it amounted to an unreasonable exercise of police power in that its classification of stamp dealers was arbitrary.
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., note 16, supra; Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369,
36 S.Ct. 379, 60 L.E. 691 (1916); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387, 36 S.Ct.
385, 60 L.Ed. 703 (1916).
Collection of cases and annotations, 26 A.L.R. 707, 708 (1923), and 133 A.L.R.
1071 (1941); Life Magazine, note 1, supra. Stamps are outlawed in Washington,
D.C., and their use is partially restricted in Washington, Wisconsin and Kansas,
according to this article.
Sperry & Hutchinson v. Hoegh, note 40, supra. This case contains elaborate
citations of cases comprising the majority view and the federal or minority view.
See Annot, 26 A.L.R., note 42, supra, and Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1214 (1952).
Senate Bill No. 55, introduced January 19, 1955.
See note 30 (2), supra.
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It is therefore submitted that the proposed amendment, if it had been
enacted, would have had no effect on the status of the trading stamp in
Wyoming; for whether specifically enumerated or not, if the proof were
sufficient, the trading stamp could be brought under the Act's classification
of "any device." Neither should it be inferred that failure to specifically
include the words "trading stamp" in the Act is indicative of legislative
40
sanction toward the stamp.
The second bill,47 which also failed to pass, prohibited customer-inducing devices or trading stamps to be used in an exclusive manner. Had
this bill been passed. it may have affected the use of trading stamps in
one respect, that is, a commercial stamp concern could not induce one
merchant to purchase its stamp plan by telling him that the plan would
not be offered to his competitors. Otherwise, the bill would have had no
effect, for if a merchant should inaugurate a plan of his own, any other
merchant would be at liberty to model his own stamp scheme on any other
plan that an individual merchant may be using.
A recent case in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, 48 may trigger
another flood of cases involving the stamp and fair trade legislation, at
least in federal courts. Colgate-Palmolive Co. sought to enjoin a nonsigner from selling trade-marked articles of the plaintiff, below the fair
trade standard. The defendant asserted that an injunction should not
issue since the plaintiff was allowing its retailers to violate the Act by their
practice of giving trading stamps with purchase of fair trade merchandise.
The court stated that the injunction would not be granted while the
plaintiff tolerated this practice. Colgate-Palmolive Co. then notified its
retailers to disist from such practice, and threatened suit against those who
refused to comply. The plaintiff then returned to court and was granted
an injunction against the non-signer.
After the injunction was granted, Sperry & Hutchinson Co., intervenor,
filed its motion for entry of declaratory judgment to determine the status
of the trading stamp in regard to price-cutting. Their motion was dismissed becaues the court said that no controversy existed and the issue was
moot. Judge Aldrich concluded that no controversy existed since the
plaintiff took steps to rectify the special defense set up by the defendant,
if it ever was a defense, and the issue no longer existed.
In Judge Adrich's original opinion, where the injunction was denied,
he discussed at length the effect of the trading stamp on the price of the
article with which it was issued, and concluded that such a device was a
price-cut, whether considered a cash discount or a trade discount, regardless
46.
47.
48.

Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., note 17, supra. Merely because the legislature
enacts a prohibition against the use of trading stamps, does not raise a presumption
that the trading stamp is bad.
Senate Bill No. 281, introduced January 25, 1957.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dischter & Sons, Inc., note 2, supra.

NOTES

of what expert accountants called it.49 He stated that the amount of the
reduction was immaterial, for either the price was cut or it was not cut.
The Act made no provision for a reasonable reduction of the purchase
price, he said.
Free competition is a major concept of free economy. It is therefore
submitted that legislative or court controls should not be imposed on a
business practice unless that practice presents a clear and present threat to
the well-being of our internal trade system. The legitimate use of trading
stamps is but one of many forms of trade inducements that have long been
customary and of wide-spread business usage. Restraints on the form of
the trade inducement is unjust in that it disregards the substance of such
a scheme, and labels it unfair because of its name.
Under the veil of fair trade legislation, the ordinary and customary
usage of trading stamps should find protection. Since they were in use
long before the adoption of such legislation, it should not be inferred that
the founders of fair trade legislation intended to strike down a practice
50
that had such wide-spread usuage and acceptance in the business world.
In like manner, statutes seeking to place uncustomary restraints on this
business practice, should be held violate of those constitutional guarantees
of freedom to live and work where one wishes, to earn one's livelihood in
51
any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or occupation.
WILLIAM

H.

JACKSON, JR.

THE BONA FIDES OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CLAIMS
So long as there is a draft of military manpower in this country under
the present statutes,' there will be cases which require the courts to rule
on the various aspects of the claims of conscientious objectors to military
service. The last three to five years have seen an increasing number of
such cases, due perhaps to greater awareness of the privileges granted to
conscientious objectors.
Historically, the conscientious objector has been handled in various
49.

50.

51.

1.

The expert witness was a C.P.A., and he testified that a cash discount was an
agreement separate from a sale and constituted an unilateral offer by the vendor
to pay something if the buyer would pay in cash, and there was no effect on the
selling price.
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, note 6, supra. The Act contained no implied exception
(applicable to trading stamps or cash register receipts), merely because the practice
prevailed before adoption of the Act, for price-cutting likewise prevailed, and the
Act stopped that practice.
State v. Langley, note 31, supra. Blume, C.J., stated in connection with unfair
competition legislation, that "The ordinary business is not conducted for the purpose
of loss. The legislature has not undertaken to compel merchants to do anything
out of the ordinary, but only what is usual and customary. It has merely attempted
to have each merchant give a fair chance to the other and do business without evil
intent."
Act of June 24, 1948, c. 625, 62 Stat. 604, as amended 50 U.S.C. § 450 (1952 ed.).

